What Stalin Knew by David E. Murphy

Author:David E. Murphy [Murphy, David E.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 978-0-300-13026-3
Publisher: Yale University Press
Published: 2005-03-17T05:00:00+00:00

These points were followed by two conclusions: “1. On the basis of all of the opinions cited above and possible versions of actions in the spring of this year, I consider that the most likely date for the beginning of actions against the USSR will be the moment of victory over England or the conclusion of an honorable peace for Germany. 2. Rumors and documents speaking of the inevitability of war this spring against the USSR must be rated as disinformation coming from English and even, perhaps, from German intelligence.29

Golikov’s March 20 doklad was probably the worst intelligence document he produced during his service as chief of the RU. It bore no relationship to reality. It was intended to appease Stalin, to reassure him that his view of Hitler’s intentions was correct and that Germany would not go to war until after the defeat of England. This is why Golikov labeled all reporting to the contrary as British or German deception. He cited only a very few of the agent reports or union republic NKGB summaries that specifically predicted a German invasion, instead carefully assembling those reports that confirmed the Stalinist view. Were these among the ones that Stalin pointed to when he told Timoshenko and Zhukov that he had his own documents?

Golikov’s reports continued up to the day of the invasion. An April 4, 1941, special report documented the steady movement of German troops to the East during March; it was distributed to the military, including Timoshenko, Zhukov, Meretskov, and Nikolai F. Vatutin.30 An April 16 special report documenting movement between April 1 and April 15 was the first one to note the arrival of river-crossing equipment in the area southeast of Brest-Litovsk, but the implications were not discussed.31

Golikov’s May 5, 1941, special report conceded an increase in the number of German divisions in the Soviet border zone (from 70 to 107) and predicted a further increase as troops were brought back from operations in Greece and Yugoslavia. The report still insisted that the Germans had sufficient troops to develop operations against England in the Near East, Spain, and North Africa.32

A May 15 special report continued in the same vein: “The regrouping of German troops in the first half of May was characterized by continuing strengthening of those against the USSR along the entire western and southwestern borders, including Romania. It was also characterized by a further strengthening of forces for action against England in the Near East, Africa, and Norway.” The report noted that “according to recent information, four to five divisions are preparing for movement through Spain to carry out operations against Gibraltar.” It appears that neither Golikov nor his head of the Information Department, Dronov, heard of the meeting between Hitler and Franco on the Franco-Spanish border on October 23, 1940, in which Franco turned down all of Hitler’s suggestions for military cooperation.33

This special report claimed eight to ten German parachute divisions, with one division or two in Greece, five to six divisions on the coast of France and Belgium, and two divisions within Germany.

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